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We develop a model in which firms hire heterogeneous workers but must offer all workers insurance
benefits under similar terms. In equilibrium, some firms offer free health insurance, some require an
employee premium payment and some do not offer insurance. Making the employee contribution pre-tax
lowers the cost to workers of a given employee premium and encourages more firms to charge. This
increases the offer rate, lowers the take-up rate, increases (decreases) coverage among high (low) demand
groups, with an indeterminate overall effect. We test the model using the expansion of section 125
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Between 1986 and 1997 the use of section 125 plans, which allow employee contri-
butions to insurance premiums to be paid on a pre-tax basis, grew rapidly. Yet over
roughly the same period, there was a dramatic decline in the fraction of workers who
were covered by employer-provided health insurance (Farber and Levy, 2000). On
￿rst thought, most of us would expect that by subsidizing health insurance through
the tax system, section 125 plans would have increased health insurance coverage.
We argue that this intuition is incomplete. Since employer-paid premiums were
already tax-exempt, in a sense section 125 plans do not increase the tax subsidy to
employer-provided health insurance. Instead, section 125 plans reduce the tax on
employee-paid health insurance premiums. We can think of this as reducing the tax
on charging employees for insurance and therefore making it less expensive for ￿rms
to charge workers. This should have two e⁄ects. The ￿rst is that more ￿rms should
charge for health insurance. In fact, there was a dramatic increase in the proportion
of those obtaining health insurance through their employer who contribute to the
cost of the premium (Gruber and McKnight, 2002). Second, more ￿rms should o⁄er
health insurance. Over this period, the number of workers in ￿rms providing health
insurance has grown. However, perhaps because more ￿rms are requiring employee
premiums, the take-up rate has declined (Farber and Levy, 2000).
We develop a simple model that predicts precisely these outcomes. As the tax
wedge between the cost to workers of employee premiums and their value to the ￿rm
declines, more ￿rms require employee premiums and the premium rises. Because this
reduces the cost of o⁄ering health insurance, more ￿rms choose to do so. However,
because fewer ￿rms o⁄er health insurance for free, the take-up rate declines. The
e⁄ect on coverage may be positive or negative.
Even ignoring the e⁄ect on government revenues, reducing the tax wedge has
important distributional e⁄ects. Health insurance coverage rises among groups in
which the coverage rate is high and falls where the coverage rate is low. Workers in
groups that generally place a high value on health insurance bene￿t from the change
1if they, themselves, value insurance highly and are hurt if they do not. The opposite
is true in groups where health insurance is generally not highly valued.
We test the hypothesis that the distribution of health insurance across skill levels
became more unequal over this period. We present evidence not only that inequality
increased but that the increase is greater than can be explained by rising earnings
inequality. Our model also has implications for the evolution of compensating di⁄er-
entials. None of the predictions is contradicted by the data although in some cases
the data are inadequate to reject alternative views.
1 The Intuitive Argument
To understand the existence of employee premium payments, we must recognize that
￿rms have only a limited ability to discriminate among workers with respect to the
plans that they o⁄er and that sorting of workers across ￿rms is imperfect (Pauly,
1986). Otherwise, ￿rms would tailor policies to individual workers or would have a
homogeneous set of workers desiring the same policy. Levy (1998), Dranove, Baker
and Spier (2000), Gruber and McKnight and (implicitly) Bernard and Selden (2002)
examine the consequence of imperfect sorting for ￿rms￿decisions regarding insurance
provision. However, they do not endogenize the allocation of workers to ￿rms. Miller
(2004) looks at the optimal decision for a monopoly hiring a ￿xed number of workers
but treats the workers￿outside options both in the labor and insurance markets as
exogenous.1
In our model, mismatching arises because ￿rms are compelled to o⁄er health
insurance in a nondiscriminatory fashion. Production requires two di⁄erent types
of workers (low and high skill) with di⁄erent distributions of willingness to pay for
1Dey and Flinn (2005) is closest in spirit to this paper in that it describes equilibrium behavior.
However, their model cannot be used to examine employee contributions. Moreover, their assump-
tions ensure that the provision of health insurance is always e¢ cient conditional on where the
worker is employed. The mismatching is a result of labor market imperfections not of imperfections
directly related to the insurance problem.
2health insurance. Some high skill workers with high valuations of health insurance
must be matched with low skill workers with low valuations. Despite the tax ad-
vantages to o⁄ering health insurance for free, if the low-skill workers￿valuations are
su¢ ciently low and high-skill workers￿evaluations su¢ ciently high, it is e¢ cient (and
pro￿table) for the ￿rm to charge for health insurance.
In equilibrium, some ￿rms choose to o⁄er health insurance for free to all em-
ployees; others o⁄er health insurance but require an employee contribution while yet
others do not o⁄er health insurance at all. When ￿rms require a contribution, some,
but not all, workers choose to purchase health insurance. Workers who must pay
part of the premium receive a compensating di⁄erential for this cost, as do workers
without health insurance. Thus workers implicitly pay for the health insurance that
they nominally receive for free, as is standard in models of compensating di⁄erentials.
Because there is a distortionary tax wedge, some workers who value health insur-
ance at more than its cost do not get insurance. Others who value it at less than its
cost nevertheless receive free health insurance from their employer. Yet reducing the
tax wedge is not unambiguously good. It has an ambiguous e⁄ect on the proportion
of workers receiving health insurance through their employer. The proportion of
workers receiving health insurance for free declines while the proportion of workers
in ￿rms o⁄ering health insurance rises and the take-up rate declines. If our objective
is to increase the prevalence of health insurance, reducing the tax wedge may be
harmful. Moreover, the tax wedge a⁄ects wages. Reducing the wedge can lower the
wages of the less skilled workers.
1.1 A Highly Stylized Example
Suppose that there are four workers of each type and that each ￿rm requires exactly
one worker of each type. For concreteness, we will assume that the full premium for
insurance is 6: Type 1 workers value the insurance at b1 = f5;7;11;12g while type 2
workers value it at b2 = f1;2;4;7g.
There is a planner whose goal is to maximize the sum of the excess of workers￿
3valuations over the insurance premium (￿(bi ￿ p)) for those workers receiving in-
surance. The planner can allocate workers to ￿rms and can require any individual
￿rm to provide insurance to all its workers or not to provide insurance to any of its
workers.
In the main part of this paper, a ￿rm can deter workers who are o⁄ered health
insurance from taking up that insurance by requiring an employee premium. There
we formally model a tax wedge between the amount a worker must earn to pay an
employee premium and the amount of that employee premium received by the ￿rm.
In that model the cost of deterring take-up is determined by the exogenous tax wedge
and the endogenously chosen employee premium.
To capture the intuition behind that model, in the highly stylized example of
this section, we assume that at an additional cost, the planner can deter individual
workers who have been o⁄ered insurance from taking it. While this cost is exogenous
in the example, the reader should recall that it is endogenized in the main part of
the paper.
What should the planner do? It is fairly obvious that he should make sure that
the type 1 worker and type 2 worker with the highest valuations get insurance and
that the ones with the lowest valuations do not. He can achieve this by allocating
the former pair to the same ￿rm and having that ￿rm provide insurance to both
workers. Similarly he can allocate the latter pair to the same ￿rm and have that
￿rm not provide insurance. He is then left over with type 1 workers with valuations
11 and 7 and type 2 workers with valuations 4 and 2. What should he do?
Suppose ￿rst that it is very costly to deter workers who are o⁄ered insurance from
taking it. Given the insurance cost of 6, the optimum is to take the worker with the
higher valuation in each pair and put them together in a ￿rm where they both get
insurance and to take the worker with the lower valuation in each pair and put them
together in a ￿rm where neither gets insurance. Thus the equilibrium involves half
of workers being in ￿rms that o⁄er insurance and all of the workers in those ￿rms
getting insurance. The o⁄er rate is .5, the take-up rate 1 and the coverage rate .5.
4Suppose now that there is little or no cost to deterring workers o⁄ered insurance
from taking it. Then the planner should assign the four intermediate workers to ￿rms
o⁄ering insurance but then pay the cost of deterring the two type 2 workers from
taking the insurance.2 Therefore, when the cost is low, three-quarters of workers will
be in ￿rms that o⁄er insurance, but only two-thirds of these workers will take the
insurance and the coverage rate will then be .5. Thus in this very stylized example,
lowering the cost of deterring workers from taking up the insurance (lowering the tax
wedge) increases the o⁄er rate, lowers the take-up rate and leaves the coverage rate
unchanged.
Of course, we have examined a planning problem rather than a competitive equi-
librium However, in this case, the two are the same.3 The real problem is that in
the highly stylized example the cost of deterring a worker from taking up insurance
is included in an ad hoc manner. In the model below, this cost arises because ￿rms
that want to deter some workers from taking the o⁄ered insurance must charge an
employee premium. This premium is costly because it means that workers who do
take the insurance do not get the full tax advantage of employer-provided insurance.
2 The Basic Model
There are two types of workers 1 and 2 distinguished by the type of work they
do, each with measure mi. It may be helpful to think of these as high and low skill
workers or as white-collar and blue-collar workers. Worker type is exogenous. Within
each type, there is a distribution Fi(b) of willingness to pay for health insurance with
0 < Fi(p) < 1 where p is the cost to employers of providing health insurance to an
employee. Fi is continuous, with no mass points and with F 0
i > 0 everywhere in the
support.
2It does not matter how these workers are matched.




with strict inequality for 0 < Fi(b) < 1:
We treat willingness to pay as exogenous to expected health costs. All workers
have the same expected health costs. There is variation in b because some workers
are more risk averse or because the variance of their health costs is higher. We do not
formally model a relation between earnings potential and willingness to pay. However
implicitly we think of type 1￿ s as having a greater willingness to pay because their
earnings are higher. This is consistent with the work of Starr-McCluer (1996) who
￿nds a strong positive relation between wealth and insurance. It is plausible that
workers with lower earnings and wealth are more likely to be eligible for government-
provided healthcare in the event of a catastrophic illness and therefore place a lower
valuation on insurance. An example in which willingness to pay depends on earn-
ings was included in earlier versions of this paper and is available from the authors
on request. Still, it is important to recognize that our formulation assumes away
problems of adverse selection.
We note that willingness to pay might depend on availability of health insurance
through some other source such as a spouse or association membership provided that
the availability of this health insurance is exogenous. Thus a worker who can get
health insurance through his or her spouse would be willing to pay no more than
the premium for that insurance. However, to model this properly would require
modelling the joint employment decision.
There is a single type of health insurance. Firms pay p for each worker for whom
they provide health insurance. Since there is no variation in the type of health
insurance available, we abstract from issues of moral hazard associated with varying
generosity of health plans.
The employee compensation package consists of a wage that may be conditioned
on worker type and the price (employee premium), c, at which workers may purchase
health insurance from the ￿rm. The employee premium may not be conditioned on
6worker type. The amount received by the ￿rm from each worker who purchases
insurance is c. The cost to the worker is ￿c, ￿ > 1. We model ￿ as arising from
di⁄erential tax treatment of ￿rm and worker health insurance premiums.
Utility is given by
ui = wi + (bi ￿ ￿c)Hi:
Workers decide to purchase insurance from the ￿rm if ￿c < b: The wage may
not be conditioned on the worker￿ s decision whether or not to purchase insurance
from the ￿rm. Note that setting c > b=￿ where b is the highest willingness to pay
is equivalent to not o⁄ering health insurance. We will treat c as in￿nite in the case
where insurance is not available at the ￿rm.
The ￿rm￿ s pro￿t is given by






where Hi equals 1 if the worker takes health insurance and 0 otherwise.
Output is produced according to a production function that is homogeneous of






We model a market rather than a game. Therefore we de￿ne equilibrium in terms of
prices and the allocation of workers to ￿rms rather than in terms of worker and ￿rm
strategies.







2 ;cK)g and an allocation of workers and
￿rms such that
1. All ￿rms make zero-pro￿t
72. No worker prefers to be employed at a ￿rm with a di⁄erent compensation package
3. All workers are employed
4. All workers have their preferred insurance status given the employee health
insurance premium
5. ￿ maximizes pro￿t at the ￿rm given the compensation package and health
insurance status of workers at the ￿rm
6. There is no other compensation package that would simultaneously attract both
type 1 and type 2 workers and make positive pro￿t.
Note that because production is constant returns to scale, the size of individual
￿rms is indeterminate.
The proof of the equilibrium, which is relegated to the appendix, proceeds as
follows. We show ￿rst that all workers of a given type at a ￿rm either purchase
or do not purchase insurance and that if all workers take insurance the ￿rm must
provide it for free. It follows immediately that there are no more than four equilib-
rium compensation packages and that these may be summarized by the set of types
receiving insurance at ￿rms with that package. We then show that a there cannot
be two compensation packages such that only type 1 workers get health insurance
with one and only type 2 workers get health insurance with the other. The proofs in
the appendix address the case of N types of worker. We show that there are at most
N + 1 equilibrium compensation packages. However, without strong restrictions on
tastes and technology, we are not able to reduce the set of potential equilibria to
one. Therefore in the text and in the remainder of the paper, we limit ourselves to
the case of two types.
Proposition 1 In equilibrium, there are at most three compensation packages.
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1 + p + (￿ ￿ 1)c (4)
b
￿
1 = p + (￿ ￿ 1)c (5)
b
￿
2 = ￿c (6)
where b￿
i represents the individual of type i with the highest valuation of health insur-
ance among those not obtaining insurance.
Proof. see appendix
Equation (1) re￿ ects the compensating di⁄erential that type 1 workers require in
order to be indi⁄erent between getting insurance for free and paying c: Since charging
for insurance is costly, c is set so it is just su¢ cient to deter a type 2 worker from
accepting the job and purchasing insurance. Therefore the highest willingness to pay
of any type 2 worker in a B or C ￿rm must be ￿c which is also the compensating
di⁄erential this worker requires to be indi⁄erent between A ￿rms and B and C ￿rms,
which gives (2) and (6). Workers who do not get health insurance do not care
whether it is o⁄ered and how much the ￿rm charges for it which explains (3). Since
wB
2 = wC
2 ; the cost of employing type 1 workers must be the same at B and C ￿rms
which gives (4), and this wage di⁄erential must leave the marginal type 1 worker
indi⁄erent between employment in an A or B ￿rm or in a C ￿rm which gives (5).
If the distribution of willingness to pay for health insurance is su¢ ciently similar
for the two groups and if the ine¢ ciency associated with charging for health insurance
is su¢ ciently high (￿ is su¢ ciently greater than 1), the equilibrium reduces to one
in which each ￿rm either o⁄ers health insurance for free or does not o⁄er it. We ￿nd
this case uninteresting and for the remainder of the paper restrict ourselves to the
case where all three packages exist in equilibrium.
9We now have all of the elements to fully characterize the equilibrium. This is
summarized in the proposition below:
Proposition 2 In equilibrium
q(￿A) ￿ (w1 + p)￿A ￿ (w2 + p) = 0 (7)
q(￿B) ￿ (w1 + p + (￿ ￿ 1)c)￿B ￿ w2 ￿ ￿c = 0 (8)
q(￿C) ￿ (w1 + b
￿




LA=m2 = 1 ￿ F2(￿c) (11)
q
0
A = (w1 + p) (12)
q
0
B = (w1 + p + (￿ ￿ 1)c) (13)
q
0
C = (w1 + b
￿
1) (14)
where ￿i is the ratio of type 1 to type 2 workers employed in ￿rms with compensation
package i.
Proof. see appendix.
Equations (7)-(9) are the zero-pro￿t conditions. Equations (10) and (11) require
that the number of workers in each type of ￿rm conforms to the number with the
appropriate willingness to pay. Equations (12)-(14) are the usual ￿rst-order condi-
tions. Note that there is only one per type of ￿rm because of the constant returns
to scale assumption.
Note that from Proposition 1 b￿
1 = p+(￿￿1)c and therefore q0
B = q0
C and ￿B = ￿C:
While our main focus in this paper is on the comparative statics of the model, it
is worth noting that the model has a number of interesting implications:
Corollary 1 ￿c < p.
10Proof. If not, the compensation cost of type 2 workers is at least as great at B ￿rms
as at A ￿rms and the compensation cost of type 1 workers is strictly greater at B
than at A ￿rms.
This means that some type 2 workers who get health insurance for free value the
health insurance at less than its cost to the ￿rm. Moreover since b￿
1 = p + (￿ ￿ 1)c,
among type 1 workers, the compensating di⁄erential for not having health insurance
exceeds the cost of health insurance to the ￿rm. Therefore some type 1 workers who
value health insurance at more than its cost to the ￿rm do not get health insurance.
Relative to the e¢ cient solution, too many type 2 workers and too few type 1 workers
get health insurance.
Finally we note that the compensating di⁄erential for not having health insurance
is larger in the group with the higher demand for health insurance.
3 The E⁄ect of Changing the Tax Wedge
In this section we examine the e⁄ect of changing the tax wedge on wages in each type
of job, the employee premium for health insurance in ￿rms that require an employee
contribution and the proportion of each type of worker employed in each of the three
types of ￿rms. Proofs of all propositions in this section are relegated to the appendix.
Our ￿rst result is quite intuitive. Increasing the tax wedge, increases the in-
e¢ ciency associated with having employees contribute to the cost of their health
insurance premiums. As a consequence, the employee contribution falls in type B
￿rms. This is stated formally in the following proposition.
Proposition 3 dc
d￿ < 0:
How bene￿cial to workers is this decrease in the employee contribution? On the
one hand, when the tax wedge goes up, the employee contribution goes down. On
the other hand, the cost of any ￿xed contribution goes up. Which e⁄ect dominates?
11The next proposition establishes that the total cost of employee contribution (c￿)
goes down as ￿ goes up.
Proposition 4 d(c￿)=d￿ < 0:
Since we have already established that c￿ is equal to the cuto⁄willingness to pay
for health insurance (b2) below which type 2 workers do not get health insurance, we
have the following corollary:
Corollary 2 Increasing the tax wedge raises the fraction of type 2 workers getting
health insurance.
And since c￿ is also equal to the compensating di⁄erential received by type 2
workers for not having health insurance, we have
Corollary 3 Increasing the tax wedge lowers the compensating di⁄erential received
by type 2 workers who do not get health insurance.
To ￿nd how the tax wedge a⁄ects the number of type 1 workers getting health
insurance, we must look at how it a⁄ects the compensating di⁄erential received by
type 1 workers who do not get health insurance. The following theorem establishes
that when the tax wedge goes up, the compensating di⁄erential between type 1
workers receiving health insurance for free and those not receiving health insurance
goes up.
Proposition 5 d(p + (￿ ￿ 1)c)=d￿ > 0
Corollary 4 Increasing the tax wedge lowers the fraction of type 1 workers getting
health insurance.
12We have established that when the tax wedge goes up, there are fewer type 2
workers without health insurance and thus more in type A ￿rms and that there
are fewer type 1 workers with health insurance and thus more in type C ￿rms. It
is therefore not too surprising to ￿nd that there are fewer of both types of worker
in type B ￿rms when the tax wedge increases. We state this formally in the next
theorem.
Proposition 6 dLB=d￿ < 0; d(￿BLB)=d￿ < 0:
When the tax wedge increases, the number of type B workers with health insur-
ance increases while the number of type A workers with health insurance falls. What
then is the overall e⁄ect of an increase in the tax wedge on health insurance coverage?
Given that the two e⁄ects work in opposite directions, it is perhaps not surprising
that the e⁄ect is unsigned. An increase in the tax wedge, lowers the number of
workers with health insurance if, in a sense made precise in the proposition below,
at the margin between receiving and not receiving health insurance, the density of
type 1 workers is su¢ ciently large relative to the density of type 2 workers.
Proposition 7 The proportion of workers with health insurance coverage falls when














A su¢ cient condition for (15) is that m1f1=m2f2>￿A where f1 is the density of
type 1 workers evaluated at b1 and f2 is the density of type 2 workers evaluated at b2:
Since ￿A must be greater than m1=m2, this condition will frequently be violated so
that there is no reason to expect that reducing the tax wedge will increase coverage.
We have seen that, when the tax wedge increases, the wages of type 1 workers in
type C ￿rms increase relative to those in type A ￿rms and that the wages of type 2
workers in B and C ￿rms fall relative to those in type A ￿rms. What happens to the
relative wages of type 1 and type 2 workers? Our intuition suggests that increasing
13￿ makes providing health insurance more expensive and should reduce demand for
the group that most values it. However, our intuition is incorrect. The following
proposition provides an uninformative condition under which the wages of type 1
workers in type A ￿rms rise and wages of type 2 workers in these ￿rms fall.
Proposition 8 dw1=d￿ < 0 and dw2=d￿ > 0 if and only if
(16) LB + LC + m2f2q
00
B(￿A ￿ ￿B)￿B > 0:
Recall that the compensating di⁄erential for being in a type B ￿rm is the same for
the two types of workers and that the compensating di⁄erential for being in a type
C ￿rm rises for type 1 workers and falls for type 2 workers when ￿ rises. Therefore
(16) is a necessary and su¢ cient condition for the wages of all type 1 workers to rise
relative to type 2 workers in the same ￿rm.
We can, however, draw a more de￿nitive conclusion about wages in ￿rms where
type 1 workers do not receive health insurance. As summarized in the proposition
below, in such ￿rms, the wages of type 1 workers rise which, in turn, implies that
the wages of type 2 workers without health insurance go down when the tax wedge
increases.
Proposition 9 dwC
1 =d￿ > 0 dwC
2 =d￿ < 0:
As discussed in the introduction, over the last twenty-￿ve years, the expansion
of section 125 plans has e⁄ectively reduced the tax wedge between employer and
employee payments for health insurance premiums. The results in this section reveal
that this reduction should have increased the number of workers being o⁄ered health
insurance, increased the number for whom insurance is available but for which they
must make a contribution to the premium, reduced the number who receive health
insurance for free and had an ambiguous e⁄ect on the number of workers receiving
health insurance through their employer. The reduction in the tax wedge should
also have had e⁄ects on the wage structure. While the e⁄ect on the wages of workers
14with free health insurance is ambiguous, the compensating di⁄erential for not hav-
ing health insurance should have increased for groups in which health insurance is
relatively uncommon and decreased in groups in which it is relatively common.
We examine some of these implications empirically in section 4. Before we do so,
we consider some extensions to the model.
3.1 Di⁄erent Tax Rates
We think of type 1 workers as being more willing to pay for health insurance because
they have higher earnings. It may therefore also be reasonable to think of type
1 workers as facing a higher tax rate and thus having a higher ￿ than do type
2 workers. This does not substantially change the model. Firms that require an
employee premium will have to pay a compensating di⁄erential of ￿1c to type 1
workers. Type 2 workers will get a compensating di⁄erential of ￿2c in ￿rms where
they do not get health insurance.
In this case, we must consider the comparative statics of changes in the two tax
rates separately. Increasing the tax rate on type 1 workers is similar to increasing the
overall tax rate in the base model. It makes it more expensive to require an employee
contribution. This lowers the optimal premium and reduces the prevalence of type B
￿rms. Thus the tax increase lowers the o⁄er rate, increases the take-up rate, lowers
the coverage rate for type 1 workers and increases it for type 2 workers and has an
indeterminate e⁄ect on the overall coverage rate, just as in the base model.
Increasing the tax rate on the type 2 workers has the opposite e⁄ect. It makes it
cheaper to deter type 2 workers from purchasing insurance in type B ￿rms. As we
raise the tax rate for type 2 workers (holding the tax rate for type 1 workers constant),
we can get the same deterrent e⁄ect from a smaller employee premium. This reduces
the compensating di⁄erential that type B ￿rms must pay type 1 workers. Therefore
type B ￿rms expand and the e⁄ects are the opposite from those obtained when the
unitary tax rate for all workers goes up.
15Therefore if tax rates changed di⁄erently for di⁄erent types of workers, we would
have to examine the details of the change carefully in order to assess its anticipated
e⁄ects.
3.2 Other Extensions
Some of the assumptions of the model are restrictive. However, relaxing these as-
sumptions makes the model very complex. We have developed examples in which
lowering the tax wedge reduces health insurance coverage for a number of examples
that extend our base model in a variety of directions. We can produce examples in
which there are more than two types of workers, willingness to pay for health insur-
ance increases when income increases and when workers with higher health insurance
costs are willing to pay more for health insurance (adverse selection). This suggests
that the issues raised in this paper are quite general.
4 Evidence
The major prediction of the model is that as the tax wedge falls, health insurance
coverage should rise in those occupations in which individuals tend to have a high
willingness to pay and fall in occupations in which individuals have a relatively low
willingness to pay for health insurance. This will be the main focus of our empirical
analysis. During the period that we study, inequality and the skill premium were
also rising. It would not be surprising if the forces that caused increasing earnings
inequality also caused health insurance to be more unequally distributed. Therefore
we will ask a more stringent question: did health insurance inequality rise more
rapidly than would be predicted on the basis of the rise in earnings inequality? Of
course, it is always possible that these forces a⁄ected health insurance coverage more
forcefully than they did earnings. To address this possibility, we will turn to other
predictions of the model.
The model also predicts that as the tax wedge falls, the compensating di⁄erential
16for having an employee premium should rise and that the compensating di⁄erential
for not having health insurance should rise among groups with a low incidence of
coverage and should fall among those with a high incidence of coverage. We will
provide some evidence on changes in compensating di⁄erentials. However, perhaps
because it is di¢ cult to control fully for productivity di⁄erences, it is di¢ cult to
measure compensating di⁄erentials (see for example, Brown, 1980). One must be
cautious when interpreting changes in di⁄erentials when the levels do not have the
right sign.
Our strategy is to look for a period when the tax wedge between employee and
employer premiums changed. We will argue below that the use of section 125 plans
expanded rapidly during a period beginning around 1987 and ending around 1996.
Therefore, we will look for our predicted changes over this period. Of course, any
changes we observe over this period may have been part of a long-term trend un-
related to the growth of the section 125 plans. We therefore extend much of the
analysis through 2001, a period when we do not expect tax code changes to signif-
icantly a⁄ect the tax wedge. We do not extend the analysis to an earlier period
because there were complex changes to the tax code during that time. It is di¢ cult
to predict the e⁄ects of these changes.
4.0.1 The Rise of Section 125 Plans
Although section 125 plans were ￿rst included in the tax code in 1978, their use
initially grew slowly. In 1986 only ￿ve percent of workers in establishments with
at least one hundred workers were eligible for ￿ exible bene￿ts or reimbursement
accounts (Committee on Ways and Means, 1994). By 1988 this had grown to 13%
(Dranove et al, 2000) and by 1991 to 36% (Committee on Ways and Means, 1994).
In 1997 the ￿gure stood at 46% (Foster, 2000). The results of the 1999 Employee
Bene￿ts Survey suggest that coverage eligibility decreased between 1997 and 1999
but the revision of the survey suggests circumspection in drawing this conclusion.
Smaller establishments show a similar pattern of growth albeit at a much lower level.
17Presumably the ￿gure in 1986 was no higher than the 5% for larger establishments.
In 1992 it reached 14% (Committee on Ways and Means) and in 1996, 18% (Foster,
2000) before apparently falling in the 1999 survey. This sparseness of this information
makes the exact timing of the increase imprecise. It suggests a start date in the mid-
to late 1980s and an end date in the mid 1990s.
Therefore we will look for the trends predicted by the model to begin around
1987 and to end around 1996 or 1997. When we look at changes between end dates,
we will look for changes between these two dates.
4.0.2 Other Tax Code Changes
Our formal model assumes that all workers face the same tax rate. In reality, of
course, tax rates vary by income and other factors. We do not believe that this is
important provided that all tax rates change similarly as they do when ￿rms adopt
section 125 plans. However, when di⁄erent workers face very di⁄erent tax changes,
it is di¢ cult to predict the e⁄ects under our model because changes in the tax wedge
for type 1 and type 2 workers have di⁄erent e⁄ects.
The 1986 tax reform dramatically change the tax structure. The marginal income
tax rate for a family of four with the median income fell to 15% in 1987 and remained
at this level throughout the period under consideration.4 Because the model suggests
that coverage should adjust di⁄erently to changes in the tax rate at di⁄erent income
levels, our model is largely silent about the predicted e⁄ects of the tax changes that
occurred in the Reagan years. Both a stronger and a weaker relation between wages
and coverage would be consistent with our model. We therefore restrict our analysis
to the period beginning in 1987. A case could be made for delaying our start date
until 1988 because the marginal tax rate for a family of four with twice the median
income fell from 35% to 28% in 1988 and remained there until 1998 when it rose
again.
4Data on historical tax rates are from Tax Policy Center (2002).
18The growth of section 125 plans stopped somewhere in the mid-1990￿ s and taxes
on high income families increased in 1998. This suggests that the changes we antici-
pate should have ended some time between 1995 and 1998. We note that there were
two tax increases in 1990 and 1993 that raised the marginal tax rate on very high
income households. These changes work against our predictions, but the number of
workers a⁄ected was small.
Finally, we note that in the early 1990s, because of the phaseout of the earned
income tax credit which had become increasingly generous, the marginal tax rate
on low-income families increased dramatically. According to our model, this would
increase the inequality of health insurance coverage across occupations and thus
reinforces our main prediction for this period.
4.1 Data
We use data on earnings and health insurance coverage from the March Current
Population Surveys. Responses from the surveys refer to the previous year so that
when, for example we compare 1987 and 1996, we use the 1988 and 1997 surveys.
In addition to obtaining information on previous year￿ s earnings, the surveys ask
whether the worker has health insurance coverage through his or her employer and
whether the employer covers all or part of the cost. We use data from the 1988(b)
through the 2002 surveys. We present results from both 2001 surveys. The results
are similar.
Unfortunately, the change in the CPS education code in 1992 makes conducting
this exercise somewhat di¢ cult. We follow Jaegar (1997) in developing a set of
imperfectly concordant codes for the two variables and use this in our estimation.
Any breaks in trend between 1990 and 1991 (the 1991 and 1992 surveys) using
education data should be treated with suspicion.
194.2 Methods
One way to ask whether the health insurance/skill relation has become steeper would
be to estimate the relation between having employer-provided health insurance and
some measure of skill such as education for each year during our time period. We
would then ask whether this relation became steeper between 1987 and roughly 1996
and ceased to increase or increased less afterwards.
There is an important problem with this approach. It is well established that
the earnings/skill relation became much steeper between 1987 and 1996. It would
not be surprising if the health insurance/skill relation mirrored the earnings/skill
relation. In fact, if health insurance is a normal good, we would expect it to do so.
Therefore we would like to ask if the insurance/skill relation became steeper
by more than would be predicted on the basis of the increase in the slope of the
wage/skill relation. The simplest approach would be to regress health insurance
status on the wage and ask if the slope of this relation increased when our model
predicts that it should have. However, our model implies that the wage depends on
health insurance and that this relation changes over time as the tax wedge changes.
Therefore we cannot treat the wage as exogenous to health insurance status.
There are two numerically equivalent ways to address this problem. The ￿rst is
to view
HIit = at + bt lnwit + XitBt + eit
as the structural equation that we wish to estimate. We wish to determine whether
bt is rising over time. Since workers, at least according to the theory, receive a
compensating di⁄erential for not receiving employer-provided health insurance, the
wage and error term are correlated. We must ￿nd some instrumental variable that
a⁄ects the wage but does not directly a⁄ect health insurance coverage.
One candidate instrument is schooling which is widely used as a proxy for skill.
Schooling does not meet modern ￿natural experiment￿standards for an instrument
because it is not di¢ cult to make arguments that people with more education should
20want more or less health insurance than workers with the same wage but less educa-
tion. However the instrumental variables estimator has a second interpretation.
The two-stage least squares estimator is numerically equal to the ratio of the
OLS coe¢ cients from regressions of health insurance and log wage on schooling.
Therefore asking whether the 2SLS estimate of b is rising over time is equivalent to
asking whether the relation between health insurance and education is rising faster
over time than the relation between the log wage and education. We recognize that
this is a weak test of the model. If we con￿rm that the 2SLS estimate of b is
rising over the predicted time period, it will not be di¢ cult to develop alternative
explanations that do not rely on our model.
4.3 Did Health Insurance Provision Become More Unequal?
The results are presented visually in ￿gure 1. Using either of Jaeger￿ s recommended
concordances between the old and new education variables, the coe¢ cient on the ln
wage in the health insurance coverage equation increased between the late 1980￿ s
and the mid- to late 1990￿ s before remaining constant or falling.5 Equivalently, over
this period the e⁄ect of schooling on health insurance grew more rapidly than the
return to schooling.
More formally, we estimate the 2SLS coe¢ cient in each of the ￿fteen years (sixteen
observations because there are two for 2000) and regress it on a time trend, a dummy
for the post-1997 period and a post-1997 trend. The results are shown in table 1.
In both cases, the trend through 1997 is positive and statistically signi￿cant. The
trend after 1997 (obtained by adding the coe¢ cients on trend and trend post 1997) is
negative and statistically distinguishable from zero in some, but not all, speci￿cation.
In neither case is the post-1997 dummy remotely signi￿cant.
5Note that we provide two sets of estimates for 2000 corresponding to the revised and unrevised
2001 March CPS.
21Figure 1:
22The necessity of dealing with the change in the CPS education question makes
the use of schooling as an instrument somewhat suspect. Therefore we conducted
a similar exercise using occupation di⁄erences. While occupation codes did change
over this period, it is relatively straightforward to align the two coding schemes.6
The di¢ culty in this case is that occupations do not have a natural ordering in the
same way that education does.
We proceed in the following manner. We combine the 1988 to 2002 March CPS
and regress the log wage on three-digit occupation dummies and year dummies.7 This
generates a standardized wage for each occupation. We use this standardized wage
as an instrument in the regression of health insurance on the log wage. Similarly
to the estimates using education as an instrument, this approach can be interpreted
as asking whether the inequality of health insurance provision across occupations
rose more rapidly than inequality of wages. This approach generates a much sharper
decline in the estimated coe¢ cient on log wage from 1987-88 to 1989. Thereafter, the
patterns using occupation and education are similar. Including the ￿rst two years
6Most of the recoding involves collapsing codes to make them compatible. Details are available
from the authors on request.
7We adjust the weights so that the observations in each year have the same total weight. How-
ever, the results are nearly identical whether we use this weighting scheme, the reported weights or
no weighting.
23gives a precisely estimated zero trend through 1997 and a negative trend thereafter.
Dropping these two years gives results that are similar to those obtained using the
education instruments.
4.4 Compensating Di⁄erentials
The model implies that the compensating di⁄erential for having to pay for health
insurance should have gone up. Over this period, the increase in price of health
insurance exceeded the growth in the CPI. Therefore, even a naive model in which
the employee premium was a ￿xed percentage of the overall premium would predict
a rising compensating di⁄erential for having an employee premium. Thus we do not
think that this test has much power for distinguishing our model from others. Nev-
ertheless, we examine this prediction for completeness. Note that the model predicts
a rise in the absolute compensating di⁄erential not the compensating di⁄erential rel-
ative to wages. Nevertheless, we calculate the compensating di⁄erential in logs in
order to provide a more rigorous test of the prediction.
The results are presented in ￿gure 2.8 As is common in estimates of compensating
di⁄erentials (see for example Brown, 1980), the compensating di⁄erential has the
wrong sign. There are at least two explanations for the failure of this prediction (and
for the common failure of empirical research to ￿nd compensating di⁄erentials). The
￿rst is that the market-clearing model of the labor market is wrong. The second is
that workers with higher earnings potential take some of their compensation in the
form of better working conditions and fringe bene￿ts. In particular, to the extent
that the tax system is progressive, higher earners should be more likely to work in
￿rms that o⁄er health insurance for free.
If we are willing to treat the bias as constant, then we can still interpret the
trend as measuring the increase in the compensating di⁄erential. As predicted by
the model, the compensating di⁄erential for having an employee premium increased
8The March 1995 survey did not ask whether the employee paid for part of the premium.
Therefore, there is no observation for 1994.
24between 1987 and 1997. over this period. The trend is signi￿cant at the .05-level
using a two-tailed test. The trend after 1997 is statistically indistinguishable from
zero and signi￿cantly lower at the .06 level than the earlier trend. While the slope
and signi￿cance of the trend through 1997 are greatly reduced if we drop 1987 from
the sample, it remains signi￿cant at the .06 level.
4.4.1 Di⁄erentials between those with and without health insurance
The model implies that within each type, workers without health insurance will earn
more than workers who have health insurance. In fact, even among workers in the
same occupation, workers with health insurance generally earn more than workers
without health insurance. Again this may re￿ ect the failure of the theory or that
within each occupation, more productive workers both earn more than other workers
and are more likely to select jobs o⁄ering health insurance.
The model also has implications for the comparative statics of compensating
di⁄erentials. We have already noted that the compensating di⁄erential for type
252 workers is c￿ which increases when ￿ falls. Thus the compensating di⁄erential
for type 2 workers should increase when the tax wedge declines. In contrast, the
increase in c￿ and the increase in the fraction of type 1 workers who, conditional on
getting insurance, pay an employee premium, both raise the average wage of type
1 workers with health insurance while (￿ ￿ 1)c + p, the di⁄erence in wages between
type 1 workers in C and A ￿rms falls. Therefore the compensating di⁄erential for
not having health insurance should fall for type 1 workers.
We test this implication empirically in the following manner. We calculate the
wage di⁄erential between workers with and without health insurance in each three-
digit occupation for 1987 and for 1996. We then calculate the change in the real
wage di⁄erential between these years (adjusting by the change in the CPI between
1987 and 1996). We then regress the change in the compensating di⁄erential on
the average coverage rate for the two years (weighting by the average number of
observations over the two years).
The resulting parameter estimate is -2421 which represents a large change in
the relation between the wage di⁄erential and the coverage rate in the occupation.
However, the standard error is 2844 so that the estimate is far from being statistically
signi￿cant.
5 Conclusion
In this paper we have explored the equilibrium pricing and provision of employer-
provided health insurance in the context of a model of labor market equilibrium.
The model generates a number of nontrivial predictions. The predictions regarding
equilibrium compensating di⁄erentials are inconsistent with the data, as is common in
models of compensating di⁄erentials. The predictions regarding comparative statics
are all at least consistent with the data and in some cases con￿rmed. We interpret
this as weak empirical support for the model.
Based on the model, we make two points which we believe to be important. The
26￿rst is methodological. If we want to measure the underlying demand for health
insurance, we must simultaneously model the distribution of health insurance pro-
vision, employee premiums and wages. The cost to a worker of employer-provided
health insurance is not only his or her share of the premium but the e⁄ect on the
wage. Given the di¢ culties in estimating compensating di⁄erentials, this is perhaps
a hopeless task. In any event, recognizing the endogeneity of matching limits the
availability of instruments because, in contrast with standard supply and demand
models, factors that a⁄ect supply are not appropriate instruments in the demand
equation and vice versa (Kahn and Lang, 1988).
Perhaps more signi￿cantly it means that we must use great caution in interpret-
ing ￿natural experiments￿at the ￿rm level. If adjustment is slow so that during
the course of the ￿experiment￿the stock of workers at the ￿rm is constant, then
eliminating the tax wedge as in Gruber and Washington (2003) must increase the
take-up and coverage rates. However, we have seen that this need not be the case
when equilibrium is restored.
The second point is substantive. The e⁄ect of tax policy on employer provision of
health insurance is complex. Not only can reducing the tax wedge raise or lower the
coverage rate, but it also changes the distribution of the recipients of health insurance.
Lowering the tax wedge increases e¢ ciency (ignoring the e⁄ect on the government
budget constraint), but it also lowers coverage among low-demand (and therefore
presumably lower income) groups. Policy analysts must exercise considerable caution
when basing conclusions on simple homogeneous worker models and models that
ignore the interaction between the labor market and the market for health insurance.
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Lemma 1 There cannot be an equilibrium compensation vector with c > 0 and in which all workers
in ￿rms with that compensation vector purchase health insurance.
Proof. Suppose there is an equilibrium compensation vector fw1;w2;:::;wN;cg with c > 0 and
all workers allocated to ￿rms with that vector take health insurance. Workers would be indi⁄erent
between the original compensation vector and compensation vector (w1￿￿c;w2￿￿c;:::;wN ￿￿c;0)
which would be pro￿table.
Corollary 5 All ￿rms in which all workers receive insurance must have the same wages.
Lemma 2 At all ￿rms at which c￿ 6= 0, workers of a given type at that ￿rm either all take or all
refuse health insurance.9
9Ignoring sets of measure zero.
29Proof. Suppose some workers of type i pay c￿ and receive insurance and some do not pay and do
not receive insurance. Workers of type j 6= i either all pay c￿ or all do not pay c￿. If c￿ < p, then
setting c = c￿+￿ > c￿, wj = w￿
j +￿￿ for all types purchasing insurance, and wj = w￿
j for all types
not purchasing health insurance and wi = w￿
i + "; ￿￿ > " > 0, would attract all of the workers
of type j 6= i that the original ￿rm attracted (and possibly additional workers) but only workers
of type i who do not purchase insurance. For ￿ and " su¢ ciently small, this must be pro￿table.
For c ￿ p lowering c and lowering wages by ￿c for groups in which at least some workers purchase
health insurance will yield more pro￿t. The argument applies equally if more than one type has
some workers who purchase and some who do not purchase insurance.
Lemma 3 Let A represent a compensation vector for which a set MA pay cA for health insurance
and B represent an o⁄er for which a set MB pay cB for insurance with cB > cA. MB ￿ MC:
Proof. For types in MB lowering cB towards cA and raising the wage by ￿￿c reduces the employ-
ment cost. Types in neither MA nor MB will not switch to purchasing insurance since they can
already purchase it at cA and choose not to. Types in MA but not MB; employed in A ￿rms value
insurance at no more than ￿cA and would not switch to the B ￿rm and purchase insurance.
A.2 Results for 2 types
Lemma 4 O⁄ers in which both types of worker receive health insurance for free and o⁄ers in which
neither type receives health insurance must exist in equilibrium.
Proof. Suppose not. Then either there are workers of both types who value health insurance
at more than its cost and are not receiving it or there are workers of one type who value health
insurance at more than its cost and workers of the other type are paying for their health insurance.
A compensation vector which gives workers of types not getting health insurance a wage of wi￿p￿"
and workers of the type paying c, wj ￿ ￿c and provides health insurance for free will be pro￿table.
The proof of the second part parallels the ￿rst.
Lemma 5 In equilibrium there cannot be an o⁄er for which type 10s purchase insurance and type
20s do not.
Proof. Suppose such an o⁄er exists. To attract type 2 workers, it must pay w2+￿c where w2 is the
wage paid to type 2 workers at ￿rms o⁄ering health insurance for free and c is the price it charge for
health insurance. The ￿rm must attract type 1 workers who value health insurance at less than ￿c.
Therefore it need pay a compensating di⁄erential of no more than ￿c to type 1 workers. Suppose
it paid less than ￿c. Then the highest valuation of health insurance among type 1 workers would
be less than ￿c and the ￿rm could reduce c and the wage it paid type 2 workers and increase its
pro￿t. Therefore, the ￿rm pays type 1 workers w1+￿c where w1 is the wage paid to type 1 workers
by ￿rms o⁄ering health insurance for free. For this to be an equilibrium both ￿rms o⁄ering health
insurance for free and those charging for health insurance must make zero pro￿t
￿A = f(￿A) ￿ (w1 + p)￿A ￿ (w2 + p) = 0 (17)
￿B = f(￿B) ￿ (w1 + ￿c)￿B ￿ (w2 + p + (￿ ￿ 1)c) = 0 (18)
30which establishes that





where mi is the measure of type i. Now
F2(p + (￿ ￿ 1)c) > F1(p + (￿ ￿ 1)c) (21)
F2(￿c) > F1(￿c) (22)
and
￿ALA = m1(1 ￿ F1(￿c)) (23)





LA > m1(1 ￿ F1(￿c))
or
(26) LA > m2(1 ￿ F1(￿c)) > m2(1 ￿ F2(￿c))
which implies that
(27) LA + Lc > m2(1 ￿ F2(￿c) + F2(p + (￿ ￿ 1)c)) > m2
which is a contradiction.
Proof. of Proposition (1)
>From the various lemmas, we know that there are only four candidates for equilibrium o⁄ers,
one in which both types receive insurance for free (denoted A), one in which neither type receives
insurance (denoted C) and two in which one type but not the other purchases insurance from the
employer (denoted B if type 1￿ s buy insurance and D if type 2￿ s purchase insurance). B and D
o⁄ers cannot both exist in equilibrium.
must exist in equilibrium. If not, a ￿rm could o⁄er
Suppose that all four o⁄ers exist in equilibrium. Then for type 1￿ s to be indi⁄erent between A
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and contradicts (35). Therefore only three o⁄ers exist in equilibrium.
Let b￿
2 represent the highest b of any type 2 at type B ￿rms: If b￿
2 > ￿c some type 2￿ s would
choose to purchase health insurance from the ￿rm which is a contradiction. Suppose that b￿
2 < ￿c,
then lowering both c and wB
1 would be pro￿table. So b￿
2 = ￿c which is equation (6). But since A
jobs o⁄er free health insurance and type 2￿ s do not get insurance at B jobs, the worker type who





Substituting ￿c for b￿
2 and rearranging terms gives (2).
By a similar argument the wage di⁄erential for type 1 workers between working in type A ￿rms
and type C ￿rms is b￿
1 which is equation (4):
Proof. of proposition (2)
The ￿rst three conditions follow from combining the zero-pro￿t conditions with the results
of the previous proposition. The fourth and ￿fth conditions ensure that the number of workers
employed in ￿rms where they do not receive health insurance equals the correct number of workers
of each type.10 The last three conditions require that the ￿rm hire workers until their marginal
product equals their cost of compensation. Because of the constant returns to scale assumption,
there is only one condition for each type of ￿rm even though each ￿rm hires two types of worker.
Proof. of proposition (3)
10Without loss of generality given the constant returns to scale assumption, we have treated each
o⁄er as being made by a single ￿rm.
32Substitute (5), (12) and (13) into (7)-(14), use ￿B = ￿C, add the two labor market clearing
conditions and eliminate the two redundant equations to get
q(￿A;1) ￿ (w1 + p)￿A ￿ (w2 + p) = 0 (38)
q(￿B;1) ￿ (w1 + p + (￿ ￿ 1)c)￿B ￿ (w2 + ￿c) = 0 (39)
LC￿B
m1
= F1(p + (￿ ￿ 1)c) (40)
LA
m2
= 1 ￿ F2(￿c) (41)
q0
A = (w1 + p) (42)
q0
B = (w1 + p + (￿ ￿ 1)c) (43)
LA + LB + LC = m1 (44)
LA￿A + LB￿B + LC￿B = m2 (45)
Then fully di⁄erentiate with respect to the endogenous variables w1;w2;LA;LB;Lc;￿A;￿B;c to get
￿Adw1 + dw2 = 0 (46)
￿Bdw1 + dw2 + ((￿ ￿ 1)￿B + ￿)dc + c(1 + ￿B)d￿ = 0 (47)
m1f1((￿ ￿ 1)dc + cd￿) = LCd￿B + ￿BdLC (48)
￿m2f2(￿dc + cd￿) = dLA (49)
dw1 = q00
Ad￿A (50)
dw1 + (￿ ￿ 1)dc + cd￿ = q00
Bd￿B (51)
dLA + dLB + dLC = 0 (52)
LAd￿A + (LB + LC)d￿B + ￿AdLA + ￿B(dLB + dLC) = 0 (53)
Solving for d￿ as a function of dc alone gives
(54) dc = ￿cd￿
(LB + LC)q00
A(1 + ￿A) + q00
B(￿m2f2q00
A(￿A ￿ ￿B)2 + LA(1 + ￿B))
A
where A = ((LB + LC)q00
A(￿ + (￿ ￿ 1)￿A) ￿ q00
B(￿m2f2q00
A(￿A ￿ ￿B)2 ￿ LA(￿ + (￿ ￿ 1)￿B))
Since q00
A < 0; q00
B < 0; ￿ > 1; f2 > 0;the numerator is negative and A is negative,thus the
fraction is positive. The fraction is multiplied by ￿c, so that dc
d￿ < 0:
Proof. of proposition (4)
(55) d(￿c) = cd￿ + ￿dc:
Substituting for dc gives






33Proof. Proof of proposition (5)
(57) db1 = d(p + (￿ ￿ 1)c) = cd￿ + (￿ ￿ 1)dc:
Substituting for dc gives
db1 = cd￿f1 ￿ (￿ ￿ 1)
(LB + LC)q00
A(1 + ￿A) ￿ q00
B(m2f2q00
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Am2f2(LB + LC) + m1f1(LB + LC ￿ m2f2q00






Lemma 6 ￿A > ￿B
Proof.
v1






which together implies the lemma.
Proof. of proposition (7).









34The right hand side has the same sign as the numerator which proves the necessary and su¢ cient
condition.
If m1f1 > m2f2 ￿ ￿A , then fm1f1 > m2f2 ￿ ￿B since ￿A > ￿B: Then
m1f1[(LB + LC)q00




A(￿A ￿ ￿B)2)] ￿ m2f2LAq00
B￿B < 0
and the numerator is negative which proves su¢ ciency.
Proof. of proposition (8).
>From the solution of fully di⁄erential equations:
dw1 = ￿cd￿
q00
A(LB + LC + m2f2q00
B(￿A ￿ ￿B)￿B)
A
dw1=d￿ < 0 if and only if LB + LC + m2f2q00
B(￿A ￿ ￿B)￿B > 0:
dw2 = ￿￿A ￿ dw1 which proves the second part of the proposition.
Proof. of proposition (9).





Af2(￿A ￿ ￿B)￿A ￿ LA)
A
> 0:
35